Prof. Gamini Keerawella Executive Director, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) and Member/BCIS Council of Management delivered the Keynote Address on “Indian Ocean: Maritime Security”, at the inauguration of the International Relations Courses of Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS) held on 10th March, 2018 at the BCIS Auditorium. Ms. Pang Chunxue, Deputy Head of Mission, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Sri Lanka graced the occasion as the Chief Guest and Ms. Madhu Dissanayake, Assistant Representative, UNFPA and BCIS Alumni was the Guest of Honour of the inauguration.
The full text of his speech can be read here:
Keynote Address delivered by Prof. Gamini Keerawella at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Academic Programmes - 2018 of the Bandaranaike Center for International Studies
Indian Ocean: Maritime Security
By
Gamini
Keerawella,
Professor Emeritus, University
of Peradeniya and
Executive Director,
Regional Center for Strategic Studies
First, let me thank Dr. Harindra Vidanage, Executive
Director of BCIS, for inviting me to make keynote address on “The Indian Ocean:
Maritime Security’ at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Academic Programs of
BCIS 2018. We have witnessed how BCIS received a new vitality in the recent
past under the capable administrative leadership of Dr. Vidanage, in line with the
vision and commitment of the chairperson of the BCIS Madam Chandrika
Kumaratunga who is keen to make BCIS a foremost center of research and
dissemination of knowledge in International Affairs in the country and the
region once again.
Being a pioneer institute devoted to IR research, BCIS had
played a phenomenal role in promoting International Relations scholarship in Sri
Lanka. I remember as a young lecturer
how I came down to Colombo from Peradeniya to attend to regional and
international conferences organized by BCIS in 1980s. It was these conferences that kindled my life-long
interest in the academic study of International Relations along with Modern
History. Systematic study of theory and practice of International Relations,
especially of what is taking place in the Indian Ocean, is more important to
Sri Lanka today than ever. You opted to follow academic programs offered by
BCIS at a very opportune time. Having said
this, I wish to return to my topic.
Throughout history, the Indian Ocean is a critical variable
in socio-political development of the people of the region and also a crucial
parameter of their maritime security. It
is an invariable outcome of its unique geo-strategic shape and its waves, a huge
bay surrounded on three sides by a land mass with cross-ocean monsoon winds.
The Indian Ocean enters into the lives of the people in the region in numerous
ways. It is an interface of connectivity
and a highway of communication. At the same time, it serves as a huge moat of
security as well as an indefinite supplier of food. At times, it becomes a
battleground to those who engage in struggle for political and economic
hegemony in the region. The Indian Ocean has always been a vibrant theatre,
strategically and politically. But today,
with the emergence of regional naval actors and regional blue water navies, it
simmers more than ever. How to respond to the strategic developments in the
Indian Ocean is always a foremost concern and policy priority of Sri Lanka, a centrally
located small island in the Indian Ocean. If we fail to grasp these on-going strategic
developments in the Indian Ocean and manage our foreign relations with a clear
vision and diplomatic finesse, we would become a passive victim of ‘great game’
in the Indian Ocean once again.
Prior to the arrival of Portuguese Caravels in the Indian Ocean at the turn of the 15th
century, no political power was able to take the entire Indian Ocean under its
single control. Maritime security in the
Indian Ocean underwent a fundamental change with the establishment of
Portuguese naval thalassocracy in the Indian Ocean. It heralded the colonial phase in the history
of the region and the control of the sea-lanes of communication in the Indian
Ocean remained the Archimedean screw of European colonial domination of
Asia. The decline of the Portuguese
naval power paved the way for a naval competition among other European powers
in the Indian Ocean, mainly between the Dutch, French and the British. In the struggle for the mastery of the
‘Eastern waters’, the British emerged as the foremost naval and colonial power
in the mid-18th century and the Indian Ocean became practically a
British lake thereafter. The hegemonic
stability based on British naval supremacy in the East-of-Suez and the ‘Pax-Britannica’ in the Indian Ocean prevailed
until the outbreak of the Second World War.
The British naval withdrawal from the Indian Ocean in the
period 1945-68 ensued a naval competition between the United States and the
Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. The
linkages that existed between the regional conflicts of the post-colonial
states in the Indian Ocean littoral and the superpower naval rivalry in the
Indian Ocean remained a conspicuous feature during the Cold War. However, regional multi-balance of forces
prevailed during the Cold War days, bringing some order to the regional
sub-systems in the Indian Ocean, despite military facts, puppet governments and
proxy wars.
The Indian Ocean witnessed many profound strategic changes
in its naval security architecture at end of the Cold War. These ushered the
Indian Ocean into a new historical phase and made it a pivotal global
geo-strategic space in global politics that defines the future direction of
international politics.
The growing prosperity in Asia after the Cold War further
increased strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. It is now estimated that
Asia will surpass North America and Europe combined in global power based on
GDP, population size, military spending and technological investment by
2030. According to World Bank, South
Asia solidified its lead as the fastest growing
region in the world in 2016. In 2016, WTO rated China the second largest
merchandise trader in the world. Accordingly, China has risen to the second
largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan in the new century. At the same time, its defense budget has increased ten-fold since
1989. Today, China claims to the second
largest navy in the world.
Nearly 40 percent of the world’s offshore petroleum is
produced in the Indian Ocean and two-thirds of
global seaborne oil trade transit the Indian Ocean though it is the
third largest body of waters in the world. The uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbon energy
resource from the Persian Gulf is vital for continued breathing of the global
economy. The Indian Ocean has become the
principal conveyor belt for the international coal trade where China and India
are now the top two importers and South Africa, Indonesia, and Australia
together account for more than half the world’s exports of thermal coal. Indian Ocean ports handle about 30 percent of
global trade.
Against this backdrop, let me identify some key salient aspects
in the evolving maritime security architecture in the Indian Ocean. First, consequent to the withdrawal of the
Soviet Navy in the 1980, the US has become the single naval superpower in the
Indian Ocean. In the changed context, however,
the United States needs a new mission and a rational to continuously be in the
Indian Ocean in its earlier posture. It
must be recognized that the hegemonic stability based on a single naval hegemon
in the Indian Ocean is not realistic in the changed constellation of global powers.
The days of Pax Britannica have gone
forever and Pax Americana or PaxSinica or Pax Indiana cannot replace it.
It is a fact that no single country will be able to dictate peace and
stability in the Indian Ocean on its own.
This compels the United States to
redefine its role, counting more on its soft power potential, rather than on
the military might, to maintain its preponderance, in the Indian Ocean to suit
the changed geo-strategic conditions though it remains the only blue-water
super power in the Indian Ocean. Robert
D. Kaplan aptly stated that indispensability, rather than dominance, must be
the US goal by serving as a stabilizing power in this complex area.
Second, the rapid acquisition of blue water naval
capabilities by India and China perhaps may be the most striking feature in the
changing maritime security architecture in the Indian Ocean. In line with the
ascendancy of China to a status of a global power, a steady shift in strategic
thinking of Chinese political and military leadership has taken place as to its
maritime domains in the last two decades.
In 2004, President Hu Jintao articulated the ‘new historic mission’ for
Peoples Liberation Army &Navy.
Consequent to redefining the role of the PLAN, naval modernization proceeded,
rapidly covering all aspects of naval mission. The new role of China in Indian Ocean is
manifested in number of overtures: a number of port construction projects undertaken
by China in the Indian Ocean littoral, including our own Hambantota, the
sailing of the belt and road initiate and the founding of Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank.
Preeminence of India in naval diplomacy in
the Indian Ocean primarily stems from its geography. The South Asian Peninsula projects into the
Indian Ocean basin centrally linking the western and eastern planks of the
ocean. It is re-imposed by its raid
advances in military technology and acquisition of naval assets. India is ranked fourth in
the Global Fire Power (GFP) ranking, based on each nation’s potential for
conventional war-making capabilities across land, sea and air. The sustained
economic growth of India since 1994 and the impressive progress in its
high-tech industry and trade accelerated India’s transformation from a regional
power to a great power at the dawn of the new century. Parallel to this development, India has made
head way with its plan to build a full-fledged blue water navy. It proceeded in
three areas: (i) on-shore infrastructure development, (ii) modernization of the
Navy and acquiring naval assets, and (iii) new naval diplomacy. Acquisition of
deeper blue water naval reach and punch by India is a crucial factor in the
present maritime security architecture in the Indian Ocean.
Third and more importantly, more fundamental and systemic
level change that is taking place slowly in global politics must be brought to
focus. Since the emergence of modern
international system, the center of gravity in global politics remained in the
west. The epicenter of global politics may
have changed over time from the Iberian capitals to Amsterdam, Paris, London,
Washington or Moscow. All were located geographically
and conceptually in the West. Consequent to the economic and politico-strategic
resurgence of Asia along with other changes in international politics, the
center of gravity in global politics is gradually moving towards Asia Pacific.
Finally, if we don’tpay attention toanother key aspect in
the evolving maritime security, my presentation will be incomplete;the activities
of non-state actors in the Indian Ocean and sources non-traditional maritime
security threats. In this regard, activities of non-state actors such as
piracy, maritime terrorism, gunrunning and the terror-crime nexus must receive
our attention.
All these developments in the Indian Ocean maritime
sphere are crucially important to a centrally located small island country like
Sri Lanka. Three geo-strategic factors of Sri Lanka’s location and domestic
politico-economic dynamics determine Sri Lanka’s approach towards the Indian
Ocean maritime issues. These
geo-strategic factors include:(i) a small island state; (ii) located in
southern tip of South Asia; and (iii) strategically at center of the Indian
Ocean linking its Eastern and Western flanks.
Though these three factors are interrelated, each factor is important on
its own. When it comes to policymaking
process, however, the domestic political dynamics of the day prevail over the
geostrategic factors. Unfortunately, strategic reading as to ‘definition of the
situation’ is highly conditioned by domestic political compulsions rather than
by geo-strategic considerations.
Hence, although the Indian Ocean always remained in the
main orbit of the Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and defense perspectives, the
relative priority given to it in the foreign policy decision-making process
varied from time to time depending on the interplay of the domestic and the
international variables relevant to the formulation of Sri Lankan foreign
policy at the time. In general, the objectives
and priorities in the Sri Lankan foreign policy are set in relation to the
three main geopolitical frames, namely the South Asian, the Indian Ocean and
Global.
Irrespective of political Peace and stability in the
Indian Ocean constitute a fundamental national interest of Sri Lanka as what
happens in the water column around Sri Lanka affect her positively or
negatively toa varying degree, depending on the gravity of the event. A single power
domination of the Indian Ocean, may it be by India, China or the United States,
is disadvantageous to Sri Lanka’s national interests. As history has taught us many a time, when a
political power comes forward to dominate the Indian Ocean unilaterally, Sri
Lanka’s sovereignty and independent action is highly curtailed. It must be
noted that China’s blue-water naval entry into the Indian Ocean and its
diplomatic overtures to the Indian ocean littoral has enhanced Sri Lanka’s
strategic significance before India and the United States.In order to make use
of the opportunities presented in this context, Sri Lanka needs handle the situation
with sharp diplomatic skills with a clear strategic plan and vision. We should
be conscious of the opportunities as well as pitfalls.
Sri
Lanka must set its priorities carefully. A new naval cold war of any form in
the Indian Ocean would adversely affect Sri Lanka’snational interests. The history of Sri Lanka since 1500 AD is
replete with experiences of falling prey to great power naval rivalry in the
Indian Ocean. Hence, possibility ofdeveloping
naval rivalries among new blue-water naval powers and resultant competitive
naval deployment by these powers is a grave concern to Sri Lanka. The presence
of a number of actors and the multi-balance of forces in the Indian Ocean
better serve our interests.
Any
competitive naval-strategic developments in the Bay of Bengal would remain a
particular concern for Sri Lanka.AnySSBN competition involving India and China
in the Bay of Bengal will have serious political and strategic implications for
Sri Lanka. In this context, what Sri Lanka can do is to use its good relations
with the two Asian giants to initiate diplomatic moves to prevent them from
moving towards a new naval cold war in the Bay of Bengal andto initiate
diplomatic moves to deescalate SSBN competition between India and China in the
Bay of Bengal.
Sri
Lanka must take due note of the fact that the United States is the only
superpower in the Indian Ocean. In many areas, both countries share a community
of interests. Freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean is a definite common
interest. The security of sea-lanes of
communication is a prime national interest of Sri Lanka, which we share with
US. In addition, a larger share of our
export market is still in the West with 27 % of total exports going to the US and
another 27% to EU. It is important to avoid the strategic trap of aligning with
one camp in impending naval cold war in the Indian Ocean. ‘Pragmatic Balance’
with a clear sense of our national interest must be our policy line. Any form
of long-term strategic alignment would not serve our national interests in the
long run.
The
term ‘the Asian Century’ has become a common cliché to describe the 21st
century in the context of the emergence of China and India as global powers and
the high growth rate of other Asian economies.
However, the concept of ‘Asian Century’ could be realized only by
economic and strategic cooperation among the Asian powers in general and
between the two Asian giants in particular.
The economic and socio-political progress of the region is highly
dependent on the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean. Further, the progress of the world economy is
also integrally linked to the progress of the Asian economies around the Indian
Ocean.
In
the present crucial phase of Indian Ocean strategic developments, Sri Lanka
cannot remain as an observer. India is now
a blue-water power on the doorstep.
China is a blue-water naval power in the close vicinity. Both are aspiring global powers. The United States is the superpower in the
Indian Ocean. Hence, delicate balancing
and smart managing of relations with the three main naval powers with a strategy
of equidistance is a national priority. In balancing these key three relations,
Sri Lanka could bring her traditional links with other actors in the region to
leverage a wider diplomatic and strategic space for Sri Lanka. Our historic relations with Japan, Australia
and South Africa as well as with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Malaysia,
Indonesia and Thailand can be cashed in the Indian Ocean maritime diplomatic
market to our advantage at appropriate junctures. For Sri
Lanka, diplomacy is the first of defense. It is the last line of defense.
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Prof. Gamini Keerawella Executive Director, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) and Member/BCIS Council of Management delivered the Keynote Address on “Indian Ocean: Maritime Security”, at the inauguration of the International Relations Courses of Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS) held on 10th March, 2018 at the BCIS Auditorium. Ms. Pang Chunxue, Deputy Head of Mission, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Sri Lanka graced the occasion as the Chief Guest and Ms. Madhu Dissanayake, Assistant Representative, UNFPA and BCIS Alumni was the Guest of Honour of the inauguration.
